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This study compares labor and total factor productivity (TFP) in France, Japan, the United Kingdom
and the United States in the very long (since 1890) and medium (since 1980) runs. During the past
century, the United States has overtaken the United Kingdom and become the leading world economy.
During the past 25 years, the four countries have also experienced contrasting advances in productivity,
in particular as a result of unequal investment in information and communication technology (ICT).
The past 120 years have been characterized by: (i) rapid economic growth and large productivity gains
in all four countries; (ii) a long decline of productivity in the United Kingdom relative to the United
States, and to a lesser extent also to France and Japan, a relative decline that was interrupted by the
second world war (WW2); (iii) the remarkable catching-up to the United States by France and Japan
after WW2, that stopped in the case of Japan during the 1990s.
Capital deepening (at least to the extent this can be measured) accounts for a large share of the variations
in performance; increasingly during the past 25 years, this has meant ICT capital deepening. However,
the capital contribution to growth varies considerably over time and across the four countries, and
it is always less important, except in Japan, than the contribution of the various other factors underlying
TFP growth, such as, among others, labor skills, technical and organizational changes and knowledge
spillovers.
Most recently (in 2006), before the current financial world crisis, hourly labor productivity levels were
slightly higher in France than in the United States, and noticeably lower in the United Kingdom (by
roughly 10%) and even lower in Japan (30%), while TFP levels are very close in France, the United
Kingdom and the United States, but much lower (40%) in Japan.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Productivity is a key determinant of the wealth of nations. Almost all theoretical and 
empirical studies that set out to explain the extremely large economic growth and living 
standard inequalities between countries focus on the differences in productivity levels and 
growth rates. These studies are numerous and our study, like most others, is based on the 
traditional “growth accounting” framework (outlined in Box 1). Its contribution is in taking 
a fresh look at the productivity macroeconomic evidence for France, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States in the very long run (since 1890) and in the more recent 
years (since 1980), thus covering a century during which the United States has replaced the 
United Kingdom as the leading world economic power, and focusing on the past 25 years 
during which the development of modern information and communication technologies 
(ICT) has contributed very significantly, albeit unevenly, to productivity growth. 
 
We have tried in this exercise to make the best use of the estimates of aggregate historical 
data series going back in all four countries to the end of the 19
th century for output (GDP), 
employment, working time and investment in physical capital (see Box 2 on Data 
Sources). As regards the past 25 years, we relied as much as possible on national accounts 
data. Many of the estimates on which our comparison is based are subject to a great deal of 
uncertainty and inaccuracy, not only for the most distant periods but also to a significant 
extent for the more recent ones. We may nevertheless hopefully consider that the orders of 
magnitude of these estimates, and the ensuing large differentials in productivity levels and 
growth rates, are fairly reliable and meaningful. One important reason to be confident is 
the long tradition of statistics gathering in the four countries. Another is that our 
comparison is limited to the economies as a whole (and the fact that all four countries had 
reasonably stable geographic frontiers over our study period). Moreover, given the 
difficulties of measuring physical capital, as well as unknown differences in measurement 
methods, we re-estimated capital stocks and services and their contributions to growth for 
the four countries on the basis of the available investment series, using constant and equal 
capital stock depreciation rates and shares of services in GDP (see Box 2). Similarly, we 3 
chose to use the same hedonic price indices (relative to GDP price indices) for computer 
hardware, software and communication equipment in all four countries, relying on those 
for the United States, which are arguably those with the largest corrections for improved 
quality.  
 
In short, we examine productivity growth for the four countries, over the chosen periods 
and sub-periods, and using three notions of productivity: labor productivity per employee 
and per hour, and total factor productivity (TFP), measured as the productivity residual 
accounting for changes in labor and physical capital input. In Section 2, we compare the 
long-run trends, and then in Section 3, we focus on the evolution during the past 25 years 
and on the major role played by the diffusion of ICT during this period. 
2.  COMPARING LONG RUN PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS 
In Section 2.1, we first look at the average long run labor productivity and TFP trends 
over the entire period: 1890-2006 and comment on the 1890 and 2006 corresponding 
productivity levels. In Section 2.2, we compare these trends and levels for the five 
following sub-periods: from 1890 to 1913, just before WW1, from 1913 to 1950 (i.e. 
including the years of the 1929 great depression and those of economic reconstruction 
and recovery after WW2, in order to smooth out the most significant effects of the 
conflict on production capacities and economic structures); from 1950 to 1973, just 
before the first oil shock; from 1973 to 1980, the period between the first and second 
oil shocks; and from 1980 to 2006, the period we will consider in more detail in 
Section 3. In Section 2.2, we also carefully compare our productivity estimates to those 
of several other studies.  
2.1. …over the entire period 
From 1890 to 2006, the overall growth of labor productivity was remarkable in all four 
countries. The levels of productivity per employee and per hour increased by a factor of 
respectively 10 and 20 in France, 25 and 40 in Japan, 5 and 9 in the United Kingdom 4 
and 7 and 12 in the United States (see Table 1). The large differentials between the 
growth rates of employee and hourly productivity reflect the huge decline in average 
annual working time: by roughly 50% in France (sliding from 3,110 hours in 1890 to 
1,540 hours in 2006), by 45% in the United Kingdom (from 2,990 to 1,670 hours), 40% 
in the United States (from 2,850 to 1,710) and 35% in Japan (from 2,734 to 1,784). 
Over these (nearly) 120 years, Japan experienced the highest average annual growth: 
2.8% per employee and 3.2% per hour, and the United Kingdom the lowest: 1.4% per 
employee and 1.9% per hour, while France and the United States were in an 
intermediate position, with France (2.1% and 2.7%) above the United States (1.8% and 
2.2%). 
 
In terms of productivity levels, few studies are available on a long period to allow some 
comparison with our results. Concerning productivity per hour, relative to the United 
States level, results from Maddison (2007) seem, for Japan and the United Kingdom, very 
close to ours (see Table 1 and Graphs 1 and 2 for our results, and Appendix Table 1 for the 
results from Maddison, 2007).
1 
 
In 1890, the level of labor productivity in the United States, whether per employee or per 
hour, was roughly four to five times higher than in Japan, 50% higher than in France, but 
25% lower than in the United Kingdom.
2 At the time, Japan and France had a much larger 
proportion of their labor force working in agriculture, as compared with the other two 
countries. It was still the case in 1970 (see Appendix Table 2). In 2006, the situation is 
drastically different. The Japanese productivity level, though still the lowest, is about two 
thirds that of the United States, and the French productivity level is close to that of the 
                                                 
1 Although Maddison (2007) does not give a level comparison for TFP, he provides estimates of 
capital stock per capita which seem roughly consistent with ours (see Table 6.4, page305). We can 
thus expect that our estimates of TFP levels of the United Kingdom and Japan relative to the 
United States are also consistent with his estimates for these countries. 
2 The relative productivity levels for France, Japan and the United Kingdom found in this study 
differ somewhat from those mentioned in Cette (2004, 2007). These results do not alter the 
commented stylised facts. The causes of these differences are two-fold. First, the data sources are 
different: those used in the present study are detailed in Box 1 while in Cette (2004, 2007) they are 
Maddison (1994, 2001 and 2003). Second, in order to ensure the continuity of historical series, we 
chose to adjust them on the basis of growth rates (as indicated in Box 1). 5 
United States, while the British productivity level is noticeably lower (by about 10%) than 
in the United States.
3 
 
Growth in total factor productivity (TFP) accounts for a major share of hourly labor 
productivity growth over the past 120 years in the four countries: roughly 50% to 60% in 
France, Japan and in the United Kingdom and 70% in the United States, while the 
contribution of capital deepening appears much smaller (see Table 2). Overall, it appears 
that the factors underlying TFP as computed, such as mainly a better educated and higher 
skilled labor force, technical and organizational changes, knowledge spillovers, better 
institutions, make a much greater contribution to observed productivity growth than capital 
deepening per se. 
 
In 1890, the level of TFP was roughly 100% higher in the United Kingdom, but 35% lower 
in France and 50% lower in Japan than in the United States. Given that TFP growth was 
relatively slow in the United Kingdom and fast in France, the level of TFP in both 
countries was close to that in the United States in 2006. Such remarkable convergence did 
not occur in Japan: for TFP it stopped at about 60% of the level of the United States in the 
early 1970s, and for hourly labor productivity it came to a halt in the early 1990s. To a 
significant extent, this can probably be attributed to persistent differences in industry 
composition. In Japan, as evidenced in Table 2, low productivity activities, such as 
agriculture, construction, trade and catering account for a larger share of the economy than 
in the other three countries. 
2.1  …by sub-periods 
Our estimates of employee and hourly productivity growth and of the contributions of 
capital deepening and TFP are given in Table 2, and shown in the corresponding Graph 3. 
                                                 
3 Bourlès and Cette (2005, 2007) have shown that France’s strong productivity performance 
compared to the United States at the end of the period can partly be explained by shorter working 
hours and a lower employment rate in France and diminishing returns of both working time and 
employment rate. Adjusting for these effects, the 2006 hourly labor productivity in France appears 
lower than in the United States by about 5%. 6 
Only a few analyses provide comparable estimations for the four countries over the last 
century. As expected, our estimates of productivity per employee are very close to those of 
Maury and Pluyaud (2004), since these authors largely rely on the real GDP and 
employment data they have gathered and harmonized. The estimates are also consistent 
with the results presented by Gordon (2003), Cette (2004, 2007) and Van Ark, Frankema 
and Duteweerd (2004), who measure labor productivity growth over different sub-periods 
using the real GDP and employment estimates calculated by Maddison (2001). Our 
estimates of labor productivity and TFP are also consistent with those of Maddison (2007) 
who makes long-term comparisons between Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, and considers in particular two of the same sub-periods, 1913-1950 and 1950-1973.  
 
Appendix Tables 3 (France), 4 (Japan, United Kingdom, and United States), and 5 (United 
States) show selected results from other researchers for comparison. As regards France, the 
labor productivity and TFP estimates by Dubois (1985), which builds on the major work of 
Carré, Dubois and Malinvaud (1972), are in very good accordance with ours, although 
these cover only market activities (and not the whole economy), and in spite of our 
simplified estimation of physical capital and of its contribution to growth (see Appendix 
Table 3). For the United Kingdom and Japan, our estimates of labor productivity and TFP 
growth are very similar to those of Maddison (2007) over both sub-periods 1913-1950 and 
1950-1973 (see Appendix Table 4). For the United Kingdom, our estimates are also 
consistent with those of Crafts (2004a, b and c). 
 
For the United States, our results for hourly productivity are not very different from those 
of Ferguson and Wascher (2004), although they consider the non-agricultural market sector 
for slightly different sub-periods (see Appendix Table 5). Our estimates of labor 
productivity and TFP growth are only roughly consistent with Maddison’s: our estimate of 
TFP growth for the sub-period 1913-1950 is higher by about 0.7% per year (2.3% instead 
of 1.6%), while our estimate of hourly productivity differs ‘only’ by 0.3% (2.8% instead of 
2.5%).  
 7 
If we combine the two sub-periods following the first oil shock (1973-2006), our results 
confirm the “Big Wave” analysis of productivity in the United States offered by Gordon 
(1999, 2003). Hourly productivity and TFP in the United States accelerate after 1913, and 
then slowdown after 1950 and much more after 1973, while the contribution of capital 
deepening to growth remains almost unchanged. Employee productivity has a different 
evolution, growing fastest from 1950 to 1973. In France, Japan and the United Kingdom, 
we also observe such a “Big Wave”. It is, however, shifted forward, with both hourly and 
employee productivity growing faster during the years 1950-1973 than in the previous 
years 1913-1950. This appears more pronounced in Japan than in France, and in France 
than in the United Kingdom. These differences between the three countries and with the 
United States can be attributed to several factors, among which are the later diffusion of 
electricity, the slower improvement in the average education and skill level of the 
workforce (Van Ark, Frankema and Duteweerd, 2004), and greater protectionism (see 
Gordon, 2003, for a review of the literature). TFP appears to be the main determinant of 
employee and hourly productivity growth in the four countries, although capital deepening 
also contributes, especially in Japan since 1950. 
 
Looking more precisely, we see behind these broad similarities substantial differences 
across the four countries depending on the sub-periods considered.  
 
From 1890 to 1913, France, Japan and the United States experienced similar annual growth 
rates of productivity per employee (roughly 1.7%) and per hour (roughly 2%). Annual 
productivity growth was lowest in the United Kingdom, mainly on account of a smaller 
TFP contribution but also lower capital per employee-hour growth. In the four countries, 
the shares of the contributions of capital deepening and TFP to productivity growth are 
roughly similar (respectively 1/4 to ½ and 1/2 to 3/4). Compared to the United States, the 
level of hourly productivity in France and Japan thus remained unchanged at respectively 
roughly 45-50% and 20-25% of the U.S. level, while that in the United Kingdom dropped 
from around 125% to 105% of that in the U.S. 
 8 
From 1913 to 1950, the average yearly growth in employee and hourly productivity was 
about 1.9% and 2.8% in the United States, that is much faster than in France (1.0% and 
1.8%), Japan (1.3% and 1.8%) and especially in the United Kingdom (0.7% and 1.5%). 
Except for Japan, these differences can be attributed to different TFP contributions, since 
capital deepening increased at about the same rate in all three countries. In Japan, the 
contribution of capital deepening was very high during this sub-period (roughly 70% of 
hourly productivity growth). Consequently, as can be seen on Graph 1, the level of hourly 
productivity dropped in 1950 moderately for France and Japan (to respectively about 40% 
and 20% of the United States level), and much more for the United Kingdom (to 65% of 
the United States level). 
 
From 1950 to 1973, the growth in employee and hourly productivity was particularly 
strong in Japan (7.5% and 7.4% per year respectively) and in France (4.7% and 5.2%), and 
much slower in the United Kingdom (2.5% and 2.8%) and in the United States (2.3% and 
2.5%). The faster productivity growth in Japan and France can be mainly attributed to 
faster TFP growth, reflecting in part important changes in their economic structure. For 
example, it is mainly during this period that the share of agriculture in French GDP 
declined significantly, and became more in line with that in the United Kingdom and the 
United States.
4 In 1973, hourly productivity in France and Japan improved markedly to 
reach a level of about respectively 70% and 50% of that of the United States, and France 
had caught up with the United Kingdom, which had experienced slower productivity 
growth. 
 
During the short period between the two oil shocks (1973-1980), employee and hourly 
productivity growth slowed down significantly in the four countries. It was highest in 
France (2.6% and 3.4% per year respectively) and in Japan (2.6% and 3.2%), intermediate 
in the United Kingdom (0.9% and 2.1%) and very low in the United States (0.2% and 
0.7%). In all four countries the slowdown in productivity growth is mainly linked to the 
                                                 
4 Card and Freeman (2002) estimated that between 1960 and 1979, the impact on labor productivity 
of a change in the weight of employment in the agricultural sector amounted to roughly 0.5% each 
year in France, against 0.1% in the United Kingdom and the United States. 9 
slowdown in TFP growth, the contribution of capital deepening being almost unchanged or 
even higher in Japan compared with the previous sub-period.
5 By 1980 hourly productivity 
in France and Japan had reached a level of about respectively 85% and 50% of that in the 
United States, and France had overtaken the United Kingdom (which had a level of 75%). 
 
During the last sub-period 1980-2006, employee and hourly productivity continued to 
slowdown in France and Japan but not in the United States where they both strongly 
accelerated, nor in the United Kingdom, where employee productivity and TFP also 
recovered and hourly productivity maintaining its pace. Productivity per employee thus 
increased fastest in the United Kingdom (2.0% per year), followed by Japan (1.8%), the 
United States (1.6%) and France (1.5%), while hourly productivity improved most rapidly in 
Japan (2.4%), followed by France and the United Kingdom (2.2%) and the United States 
(1.6%). The slowdown in productivity can be attributed to the slowdown in both capital 
deepening and TFP growth in France, and to capital deepening only in Japan. The 
acceleration in productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom is also seen in TFP, 
while the contribution of capital deepening remained about the same in the United States and 
even declined in the United Kingdom. France continued to experience on average the highest 
TFP growth, in spite of very significant slowdown (from 1.8% to 1.3% per year). 
 
Consequently, the level of hourly productivity relative to that in the United States increased 
markedly in France to become equal to that in the United States, and to a lesser extent in 
Japan and in the United Kingdom, reaching roughly 70% and 90% of the U. S. level. 
3.  LOOKING MORE CLOSELY AT PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN 
THE 1980-2006 PERIOD 
In Section 3.1 we first focus on the changes in productivity growth over the five or ten year 
sub-periods 1980-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000 and 2000-2006, then in Section 3.2 we 
                                                 
5 Cette and Bourlès (2007) have made the case that two thirds of the slowdown in US productivity 
growth over this sub-period can be accounted for by a rise in the employment rate and a smaller 
decline in working hours, with strong diminishing returns in both variables. 10 
consider and comment on the specific contribution to growth of the rapid and pervasive 
diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICT) during these sub-periods. 
3.1  Changes in productivity growth 
Our estimates of employee and hourly productivity growth and the contributions of non-
ICT and ICT capital deepening and TFP are presented by sub-periods in Table 3, and in the 
corresponding Graph 4 (in the same format as Table 2 and Graph 3). 
 
During sub-period 1980-1990, employee productivity growth was the highest in Japan with 
an average rate of 2.7% per year, followed by France and the United Kingdom with a rate 
close to 2%, and it was the lowest in the United States with a rate of 1.4% (still, a much 
higher average rate than the 0.2% recorded in the previous sub-period 1973-1980). Hourly 
productivity growth was much faster in both Japan and France (close to 3%) than in the 
United Kingdom (2.0%) and the United States (1.4%). The growth differential in hourly 
productivity between Japan and France on the one hand and the United Kingdom and the 
United States on the other can be accounted for by a higher TFP contribution (1.5% and 
1.7% as against 1.0% and 0.8%), as well as a greater contribution of capital deepening 
(1.6% and 1.2% as against 1.0% and 0.6%).  
 
Over the sub-period 1990-1995, productivity growth differed widely across countries. In 
the United States, it was slightly slower than in the previous sub-period 1980-1990, 
corresponding to a slower TFP growth. In the United Kingdom, employee and hourly 
productivity growth increased sharply (by 0.7% and 0.8% respectively). A large share of 
this acceleration is due to a higher contribution of capital deepening. In France, employee 
and hourly productivity growth slowed considerably, both by about 1.0%. This slowdown 
reflects almost entirely that in TFP growth (which declined by 1.0%), and probably 
corresponds to a strong cyclical component given the decrease in GDP growth. The 
stronger TFP growth characteristic of France as compared to the United Kingdom and the 
United States thus came to an end in the early 1990s. In Japan, employee and hourly 
productivity growth also slowed down considerably, by 1.8% and 0.7% respectively. As in 11 
France, this slowdown appears to be mostly related to a corresponding slowdown in TFP 
growth.  
 
The sub-period 1995-2000 is characterized by a significant rise in GDP growth in France, 
the United Kingdom and the United States (by roughly 1.5% per year), but not in Japan 
where GDP growth slowed even further than previously (by 0.5%). As in the first half of 
the 1990s, productivity growth has developed differently in the four countries. In the 
United Kingdom, per hour and hourly productivity growth slowed down by approximately 
0.5% per year, due to a lower contribution of non-ICT capital deepening and of TFP. In 
France, it remained stable, the acceleration in TFP being offset by a slowdown in non-ICT 
capital deepening (by 0.6%). This slowdown may result partly from the implementation of 
policies designed to enhance the labor intensity of growth, in particular reducing working 
time and cutting social contributions targeted at low skilled workers (see Cette, 2004). In 
the United States, productivity growth gained approximately 1% due to faster TFP growth. 
According to Gordon (2005), the fact that productivity accelerates in the United States but 
slows down in Europe can be attributed to several factors, among which are a 
predominance of ICT-producing industries, public policies that promote entrepreneurship, 
and better synergy between public research, private research and the financing of 
innovation. Finally, in Japan TFP growth remained stable and the slowdown in 
productivity is entirely due to a slowdown in non-ICT capital deepening.  
 
The last sub-period 2000-2006 is characterized by a slowdown in productivity (about 0.4%) 
in France and the United-Kingdom and a small acceleration in productivity in the other two 
countries (by 0.2%). This is mainly accounted for by a smaller contribution of ICT capital 
deepening in the United Kingdom, of TFP in France, a higher contribution of capital 
deepening in the United States and of TFP in Japan. 
 
To conclude, the productivity per employee and per hour graphs show that growth was 
mostly higher in the United States over the period 1995-2006 than in the other three 
countries, implying that the catching-up process had slowed or stopped. This result is due 
to higher growth in both ICT and non-ICT capital intensity and also in TFP (mainly due to 12 
ICT-producer industries, see below) in the U.S., in comparison with the previous period. 
Therefore the success of the United States’ productivity growth relative to the other three 
countries over the period 1995-2006 is due to ICT but not to ICT alone.  
3.2  The contribution of ICTs to productivity  
A number of studies (see for example Cette, Mairesse and Kocoglu 2002 and 2005b for a 
review of the literature) have tried to assess the contribution of ICTs to GDP and 
productivity growth, many of them relying on macroeconomic evidence and on the growth 
accounting framework. Most, if not all, of these studies conclude that ICTs have had a 
positive and significant impact over the past two decades, via two main channels:  
 
•  Substitution effects linked to the accumulation of ICT capital (capital deepening), 
which itself results from the continuous and rapid improvements in the productive 
performance of ICT investments, leading to a sharp fall in the price of ICT relative 
to other capital goods and labor. To take the most striking case, in the United States 
over the 1980-2004 period the price of computer hardware has decreased at an 
average yearly rate of 15%, while the GDP price deflator increased at an average 
yearly rate of 3%.  
 
•  TFP gains largely driven by rapid technological progress in the different ICT-
producing industries. 
 
As stressed in Cette, Mairesse and Kocoglu (2000), the relative importance attached to 
these two effects in growth accounting analyses depends to a great extent on the 
methodological choices and practices of statisticians and national accountants in measuring 
the prices of ICT and using them to construct real ICT investment series from nominal ICT 
investment. The more the estimation of price changes takes into account the improvements 
in ICT performance (through substantially upgraded products or new products), by relying 
in particular on hedonic methods, the larger is the contribution of capital deepening to 
productivity gains and the lower that of TFP, and conversely.  13 
 
In what follows, we first briefly comment on the estimates of the ICT investment ratios to 
GDP in the four countries, then on the changes in ICT prices. We finally focus on the 
comparison of our estimates of the ICT capital deepening contribution to productivity 
growth across the four countries and with other studies.  
 
a) ICT investment ratios to GDP  
Measuring ICT investment in nominal terms already raises a number of difficulties. Putting 
aside the problem of the availability and reliability of series long enough to estimate 
capital stocks and services by implementing the (misleadingly called) permanent inventory 
method, a major difficulty is the breakdown between investment and intermediate 
consumption of total ICT expenditures, and another one is the measurement of investments 
in custom software and the purchase of prepackaged software. The solutions adopted by 
national accountants have differed between countries as well as over time.  
 
For example, following the OECD recommendations on the international harmonization of 
the methods for measuring software investment, INSEE, the French National Institute for 
Statistics and Economic Studies, changed its methods for breaking down software 
expenditures between intermediate consumption and investment on the one hand, and for 
measuring custom software expenditures on the other. As a result, the amount of software 
investment in 1999 rose from 11 billion Euros in the previous 1995-based national 
accounts to 21 billion Euros in the current 2000 base, that is a 90% increase. In the United 
Kingdom, Chesson and Chamberlin (2006) have shown that the methodological change in 
the measurement of software investment, particularly own account software, has led to a 
rise in the ratio of total software investment to GDP from 0.8% to 1.8% in 1999. These 
measurement difficulties also affect, but to a lesser extent, the estimation of ICT hardware 
investment. The estimates presented here are based on the most recent available statistics 
from all the countries, and therefore different from those in the older comparable studies.
6 
                                                 
6 For France, these estimates are updated versions of those given in Mairesse, Cette and Kocoglu, 
2000, which can be referred to for more details on the assumptions and problems involved in the 
different steps of the calculations of ICT capital and its contribution to growth.  14 
 
Looking at Appendix Graph 1, which shows the ICT to GDP investment ratios in the four 
countries, we observe the following: 
 
•  In 1980, ICT investment in the United States accounted for 2% of GDP against 
only 1.2% in France and the United Kingdom and 1.4% in Japan. By 2005, the 
share of ICT investment to GDP had increased by a factor of two in the four 
countries; 
 
•  Overall, the ICT investment ratio to GDP has evolved similarly in the four 
countries. It accelerated from 1980 to 1985 and from 1995 to 2000, and remained 
stable, or even declined, from 1985 to 1994, and dropped slightly between 2001 
and 2005; 
 
•  The burst of the Internet bubble in 2000-2001 led to a substantial fall in the ICT 
investment ratio in the four countries. In the United Kingdom and the United States 
particularly, the ICT investment ratio fell from 4.9% to 3.6% between 2000 and 
2005. Such a decline in ICT investment appears to be a correction to overshooting at 
the end of the 1990s, partly fuelled by the financial market dotcom euphoria and the 
investment due to the possibility of a Y2K bug. 
 
b) Changes in ICT prices 
As already mentioned, perhaps the major difficulty, and hence the major uncertainty, in 
measuring the contribution of ICT capital deepening to growth lies in the measurement of 
changes in the prices of ICT products, which have had very rapid quality improvements in 
the recent past. Price statisticians and national accountants are gradually adopting hedonic 
methods to adjust prices for such quality improvements. However, there are substantial 
differences in the way in which different countries apply these methods. To avoid that such 
differences affect our comparison, and considering that ICT products with basically 
comparable characteristics are produced or imported everywhere in the developed world, 
we chose to rely only on the United States national accounts price indices for ICT 15 
products. Precisely, we have assumed that, relative to the overall GDP price index, the 
quality adjusted prices for the three ICT product categories that can be distinguished in the 
national accounts (i.e., computer hardware, software and communication equipment) are 
the same in France, Japan and the United Kingdom as in the United States. This method, 
proposed by Colecchia and Shreyer (2001), seems realistic enough for developed countries 
and better than relying on national accounts data for ICT products that are not yet based on 
harmonized methods for quality adjustment. 
 
Appendix Table 8 gives the overall ICT price average yearly growth rates by sub-period in 
the four countries calculated by weighting the price growth rates for computer hardware, 
software and communication equipment. The differences between countries arise from (i) 
differences in the GDP price growth rates and (ii) differences in the composition of ICT 
investments in computer hardware, software and communication equipment. Computer 
hardware experienced the largest price fall relative to other ICT products.
7 Over the 1980-
2005 period, the average annual decline in ICT prices was of the same magnitude in the 
United Kingdom and the United States (roughly 5%). In Japan, ICT prices decreased 
somewhat faster (by 5.7% per year) due to the slower growth of the GDP price (0.7% 
compared to 3%) and the larger share of computer hardware.
8 In France, the price decreased 
less rapidly (by 4% per year) because of the smaller share of computer hardware and a faster 
growth of the GDP price. The 1995-2000 period is that of the most pronounced decease in 
ICT prices in the four countries, ranging from 6.7% per year in France to 9.5% per year in 
Japan. 
 
c) The contribution of ICT to productivity growth 
The contribution of ICT to labor productivity growth is shown in Table 3 and Graph 4. The 
main findings are the following: 
 
                                                 
7 Between 1980 and 2005, computer hardware prices in the United States decreased at an average 
annual rate of 15%, compared with roughly 1% per annum for both software and communication 
equipment. 
8 On average over the 1980-2005 period, computer hardware accounted for 25% of ICT investment 
in France, against 40% in the United Kingdom, 28% in the United States and 45% in Japan.  16 
•  Over the entire 1980-2006 period, the contribution of ICT capital to productivity 
growth per hour is greater than that of non-ICT capital in the United States but less 
than that of non-ICT capital in the other three countries; 
 
•  The contribution of ICT capital to average annual productivity growth (per 
employee or per hour) ranges, depending on the period, from 0.3 point to 0.7 point 
in the United States and the United Kingdom, from 0.3 point to 0.6 point in Japan 
and finally from 0.2 point to 0.3 point in France. The ICT investment ratio is 
roughly the same in the United Kingdom and the United States (see Appendix 
Graph 1), and the contribution of ICT to productivity growth is also the same. This 
important ICT impact can be attributed to the significantly faster average annual 
growth rate of the capital stock due to the rapid decrease in the global ICT price 
index (see Appendix Table 8). Compared to previous studies, the result that the 
contribution to productivity growth of ICT capital deepening was the same in the 
United Kingdom and in the United States can be attributed to the improvement in 
the measures of ICT investment in the United Kingdom from using a more 
appropriate price index. In France and Japan, the investment ratio is low and the 
annual growth rate of ICT capital per capita is slightly lower than in the United 
States; 
 
•  In all four countries, the contribution of ICT capital is the largest over the 1995-
2000 period. It amounts to roughly 0.7 point in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, 0.6 point in Japan and 0.3 point in France. At the same time, the 
contribution of other equipment and buildings declined considerably in France, 
Japan and the United Kingdom compared with the previous period (about 1%). The 
faster decline in ICT prices over this period (Appendix Table 8) seems to have 
accelerated the substitution between ICT capital and non-ICT capital; 
 
•  Lastly, after 2000, the fall in ICT investment is directly reflected in the contribution 
of ICT capital to productivity growth. This effect is the less pronounced in France 
(-0.1% and -0.2% to -0.3% in the other three countries). Except in Japan, this 17 
period was also marked by an increase in the contribution of non-ICT capital 
deepening to productivity growth in all countries, particularly in the United States 
(about 0.4%). 
 
Cette and Lopez (2008) analyze in more detail the ICT diffusion gap among major 
industrialized countries vis à vis the United States during the period 1981-2005. Their 
results confirm the (positive) impact of the share of the population having completed 
higher education and the (negative) impact of market rigidities on ICT diffusion. These 
effects are heightened when ICT diffusion is already substantial. Compared to the United 
States, the lower ICT diffusion in the United Kingdom is explained by a shortfall in 
highly educated employees and for France and Japan by both lower shares of highly 
educated workers and also by higher market rigidities.  
 
On the whole, the results presented here are in keeping with those obtained in the most 
recent international comparative studies, such as those by Jorgenson and Kuong (2005), 
the OECD (2003) or Van Ark and Piatkowski (2004), presented in Appendix Table 6. As 
regards France, they are consistent with our previous assessments (see Cette, Mairesse 
and Kocoglu, 2005b). For the United Kingdom, they are not directly comparable to the 
recent assessments by Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) on the market economy; although 
their profile is similar, the contribution of ICTs is lower than in our estimates. According 
to these authors, the contribution of ICT capital deepening accounts for 0.7% of the 
average annual increase in hourly labor productivity between 1979 and 1990 and for 
1.0% over the 1990-2000 period. As regards the United States, although the scope of the 
economy covered is different, our results are very close to those of Jorgenson, Ho and 
Stiroh (2006, 2008), and Oliner, Sichel and Stiroh (2007), presented in Appendix Table 
7. As regards Japan, our estimates are close to those of Jorgenson and Kuong (2005) for 
the 1990s but they show a greater decrease in the contribution of ICT capital-deepening 
to growth during the period 2000-2006 (see Appendix Table 6).  
 
As mentioned above, national accountants are faced with a number of methodological 
problems when assessing ICT investment expenditure and establishing the volume-price 18 
breakdown. However, since national accountants have been following the 
recommendations of the OECD-Eurostat Software Task Force, the measure of investment 
in software is more homogenous across countries.  
4.  CONCLUSION 
The results of our study, in spite of being highly aggregated and confirming facts for many 
of them already known, are nevertheless striking. Possibly the most thought provoking 
findings are the far-reaching changes in the relative economic situation in France, Japan, 
the United States and the United Kingdom over the long period. While all four countries 
have experienced very rapid economic growth and extraordinary productivity gains, the 
past 120 years have also been characterized by the long relative decline of the United 
Kingdom until WW2, the impressive catching-up of Japan which came to a stop in the 
1990s and that by France at least until recently. 
 
At present, total factor productivity is very close in the four countries except Japan, where 
it is still significantly lower. However, hourly labor productivity is slightly higher in 
France than in the United States, significantly lower in the United Kingdom, and even 
lower in Japan. Furthermore, productivity per employee is slightly lower in France than in 
the United States, much lower in the United Kingdom and even lower in Japan. These 
differences reflect the more or less contrasting developments during the various periods of 
the analysis, associated with varying contributions of capital deepening and the downward 
trend in working hours. 
 
Between 1890 and 2006, a faster drop in working time accounts for roughly 25% of the 
differential in the growth of productivity per employee between France and the United 
States, and just about 5% of that between the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Similarly, over the same period, the lower contribution of capital deepening explains 15% 
of the differential in the growth of productivity per employee between France and the 
United States and almost 25% of that between the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The other growth factors underlying total factor productivity account for 100% of France’s 19 
catching-up with American labor productivity and for 40% of the decline in British labor 
productivity compared with the United States. These other growth factors (i.e. working 
hours and capital deepening “being equal”) would thus account for the almost three-fold 
increase in French labor productivity compared with the United Kingdom, i.e. an average 
annual growth differential over 116 years of 1.0%. 
 
It thus appears that the productivity catching-up process differs strongly among countries 
and periods. The three important questions are then: (i) why do some countries (and not 
others) benefit at certain periods (and not others) from a productivity catching-up of the 
highest country level? (ii) What are the determinants of the speed of this catching-up 
process when it happens? (iii) Why is this catching-up process achieved for some countries 
but ends before being achieved for others? Important recent literature suggests that these 
differences can mainly be explained by the education level of the working age population 
and by institutional aspects, such as rigidities in labor, product and financial markets.  
 
However, the respective contribution of each of these different factors has not been 
precisely assessed. There is no consensus in the empirical literature on the effect of labor 
and product markets rigidities on growth. Numerous studies assess very disparate results: 
either no effect, or a positive or a negative impact (for a survey emphasising this diversity, 
see Babetskii and Campos, 2007). 
 
In recent analysis, Aghion and Howitt (2006) and Aghion et al. (2009) stress that the 
education level and rigidities in labor and product markets have different effects depending 
on whether a country is far from or close to the technological frontier. We know that in the 
current period market rigidities are, at an aggregate level, the highest in Japan and the 
lowest in the United States, with France and the United Kingdom being in an intermediate 
situation. Such higher market rigidities in France, Japan and the United Kingdom than in 
the United States may have penalized them more in recent years when they are  much 
closer to the United States technological frontier  than during the period 1950-1980 when 
they were much farther from it. This might explain in part why the catching-up process 20 
with the United States productivity has ended in the last two decades before being 
completely achieved for France, the United Kingdom and mainly Japan. 21 
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Box 1: The growth accounting approach to estimating the contribution 
of TFP and capital deepening 
 
Solow (1956, 1957) was one of the first proponents of the “growth accounting 
approach” to assess the contributions of the main factors of production to economic 
growth, in particular capital deepening and “total factor productivity”, or TFP.
9 
Assuming that the production possibilities may be represented using a production 
function with a multiplicative TFP term (standing for autonomous technical progress 
and other unmeasured factors), we can write:  
 
Y = TFP. F(Kj, Li) 
 
where Y denotes the production output and Kj and Li represent respectively the services of 
the  various  types capital and labor (or other variable inputs). With a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, with labor considered as homogeneous (which is the case in the 
present study), and taking logarithms and first differences (corresponding approximately 
to growth rates), we obtain the following linear relation: 
 
Δy = Δ tfp + ∑j αjΔkj + βΔl 
 
where αj and β are the elasticities of output with respect to the inputs Kj and L. 
 
Assuming also unit (constant) returns to scale (i.e. ∑j αj + β = 1), the growth rate of 
output can be written as the sum of the growth rate of each input weighted according to its 
production elasticity and the growth rate of TFP. Growth accounting can also be 
presented in terms of labor productivity accounting (assuming constant returns to scale), 
as follows, respectively in log-levels and log-growth rates:  
 
(y-l) = tfp + ∑j αj(kj-l)     and(Δy-Δl) = Δtfp + ∑j αj(Δkj-Δl). 
 
In order to implement such decomposition, it is necessary to have data on output, labor 
and capital. In macroeconomic analyses, these data are available in national accounts. The 
sources used in this study are detailed in Box 2. It is also necessary to measure the output 
elasticities with respect to the different inputs. In addition to the hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale, it is generally assumed that production factors are remunerated at their 
marginal productivity (at least over the medium to long term), which means that it is 
possible to estimate the factor elasticities on the basis of the share of their remuneration 
(cost) in total income (or total cost). Given that labor costs (wages and related taxes and 
social security contributions) represent roughly two thirds of income, we simply took here 
β = 0.7 and therefore ∑i αi = 0.3. Note also that we have taken as the measure of capital K 
used in year t the stock of capital installed at the end of year (t-1). 
                                                 
9 For a history of growth accounting and TFP (“the residual“), see Griliches (1996) and Maddison 
(2007). 27 
 
TFP is thus measured as a “residual”: it is the contribution to labor productivity that is not 
attributable to all factors not considered explicitly in the growth accounting 
decomposition. Although such analysis does not provide causal explanations and is 
mainly descriptive, it can be useful for making comparisons and looking for the sources 
of differences in productivity levels and growth rates between periods and countries.  
 
In our study, the volume of labor L is written as L = N*H where N is the level of 
employment and H the average annual working time, and the decomposition of 
productivity is presented either in terms of productivity per employee or productivity per 
hour on the basis of the two following relations:  
 
(y-n) = tfp + ∑j αj(kj –n) + (1 -∑j αj)h  or  Δ(y-n) = Δtfp + ∑j αjΔ(kj -n) + (1 -∑j αj)Δh 
 
(y-l) = tfp + ∑j αj(kj-l)     or     Δ(y-l) = Δtfp + ∑j αjΔ(kj-l) 
 
In Table 1 and Graph 2, we present TFP level in France, Japan and the United Kingdom  














Box 2: Data Sources 
 
The data sources on which we rely in this study are historical or national accounts series, 
which we put together to construct indicators over the very long term or, in the case of 
ICT, over the past few decades. In order to avoid breaks in these indicators, for sources 
from the more distant periods we calculated them using growth rates applied to the 
available historical and national accounts series. 
 
In order to compare the levels of variables, we first expressed them in constant domestic 
currency terms on the basis of the year 2000, and then converted them into 2000 constant 
dollar terms, using the PPP exchange rates derived implicitly from PPP 2000 constant 
dollar GDP estimates provided by Maddison (2003). 
 
The most commonly used databases are those of Maury and Pluyaud (2004), Cahn and 
Saint-Guilhem (2006) and Kocoglu (2001), which we respectively denote by (a), (b) and 
(c) in what follows. 
 
GDP (gross domestic product) 
–  France: National accounts for the period 1959-2006 and Villa (1994)a for the period 
prior to 1959; 
–  Japan: National accounts for the period 1994-2006, OECD for the period 1970-1994 
and Maddison (2001, 2003) for the period prior to 1970; 
–  United Kingdom: National accounts for the period 1965-2006b, Groningen Growth 
and Development Centre (GGDC) and Feinstein (1976) for the period prior to 1955a; 
–  United States: National accounts (BEA) for the period 1929-2006b and Mitchell 
(1998)a for the period prior to 1929. 
 
Employment (average number of workers) 
–  France: National accounts from OECD for the period 1970-2006, GGDC for the 
period 1959-1970 and Villa (1994)a for the period prior to 1959; 
–  Japan: OECD for the period 1970-2006, GGDC for the period 1959-1970 and 
Maddison (2001, 2003) for the period prior to 1959; 
–  United Kingdom: OECD for the period 1970-2006, GGDC for the period 1959-1980 
and Feinstein (1976)a for the period prior to 1959; 
–  United States: National accounts for the period 1970-2006b, GGDC for the period 
1959-1970 and Mitchell (1998)a for the period prior to 1959. 
 
Working time (average number of hours worked per year, per worker) 
–  For the four countries: OECD for the period 1970-2006; GGDC for the period 1950-








–  France: National accounts for the period 1959-2006, Maddison (1993) for the period 
1935-1959, Levy-Leboyer (1978)c for the period 1820-1935. The breakdown of total 
GFCF between equipment and buildings is taken from Villa (1994) for the period 
1820-1935; 
–  Japan: National accounts for the period 1980-2006 and Maddison (1993) for the 
period prior to 1980; 
–  United Kingdom: National accounts for the period 1965-2006b and Maddison (1993) 
for the period prior to 1965; 
–  United States: National accounts for the period 1967-2006b and Maddison (1993) for 
the period prior to 1967. 
 
ICT investment 
-   France: GGDC (EUKLEMS) for the period 1970-2005;  
-   Japan: GGDC (EUKLEMS) for the period 1970-2004; 
-   United Kingdom: GGDC (EUKLEMS) for the period 1970-2005; 
-   United States: GGDC (EUKLEMS) for the period 1970-2005 and trend from the 
BEA for the market economy for the period 1959-1969. 
 
Fixed capital 
–  Fixed capital series are constructed on the assumption that the annual depreciation 
rates are: 2.5% for buildings, 10% for non-ICT equipment, 15% for communication 
equipment and 30% for computer hardware and software. The coefficients used to 
take into account WW1 and WW2 damages in France are taken from Villa (1994)c. 
For Japan, WW2 damages are implicitly taken into account by using the Maddison 
(1993) growth rate for the period prior to 1946. For this country, the WW2 damage 
coefficients are those proposed by the Bank of Japan (1966), and the Maddison 
depreciation assumption (1993) are consistent with ours. 
 
Prices of ICT products  
–  The relative ICT price indexes (compared to GDP prices) for France, Japan and the 
United Kingdom are the same as those taken from the United States national 














Table 1: Productivity levels and average growth, 1890-2006 -(ppp 2000 dollar) 
 
  Annual average growth rates,  
in %, 1890-2006 
Levels, as a % of the United States level 
1890 2006 




France Japan United 
Kingdom 














1.6  1.8  1.0  1.6  65.9  49.9 203.0  90.8  60.6 105.9 









Table 2: Average annual labor productivity growth and contributions (% per year), in France, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States 
 
A – France 
  1890-  1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1980 1980-2006
GDP  1.9 0.9 5.3 2.9 2.1
Productivity per employee [a]  1.6 1.0 4.7 2.6 1.5
Productivity per hour [b]  1.9 1.8 5.2 3.4 2.2
Contributions to productivity per 
hour:    
Capital intensity, per hour [c]   0.5 0.3 1.2 1.6 0.9
Total factor productivity [d]  1.4 1.5 4.0 1.8 1.3
 
B – Japan 
  1890-  1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1980 1980-2006
GDP  2.5 2.2 9.3 3.4 2.3
Productivity per employee [a]  1.8 1.3 7.5 2.6 1.8
Productivity per hour [b]  2.1 1.8 7.4 3.2 2.4
Contributions to productivity per 
hour:    
Capital intensity, per hour [c]   0.9 1.1 2.0 2.3 1.4
Total factor productivity [d]  1.2 0.7 5.4 0.9 1.0
 
C – United Kingdom 
  1890-  1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1980 1980-2006
GDP  1.9 1.3 2.9 1.0 2.5
Productivity per employee [a]  0.9 0.7 2.5 0.9 2.0
Productivity per hour [b]  1.2 1.5 2.8 2.1 2.2
Contributions to productivity per 
hour:    
Capital intensity, per hour [c]   0.3 0.5 1.6 1.6 1.1
Total factor productivity [d]  0.9 1.0 1.2 0.5 1.1
 
D – United States 
  1890-  1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1980 1980-2006
GDP  4.1 3.2 4.0 2.5 3.1
Productivity per employee [a]  1.6 1.9 2.3 0.2 1.6
Productivity per hour [b]  2.0 2.8 2.5 0.7 1.6
Contributions to productivity per 
hour:    
Capital intensity, per hour [c]   0.7 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.7
Total factor productivity [d]  1.3 2.3 1.7 0.1 0.9
[b] = [c] + [d]. Source: Authors’ estimation, see Box 1 for data sources and Box 2 for details on TFP 






Table 3: Average annual labor productivity growth and contributions (% per year), in France, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States 
 
A - France 
 1980-2006 1980-1990  1990-1995  1995-2000 2000-2006
GDP  2.1 2.4 1.2 2.8 1.7
Productivity per employee [a]  1.5 2.1 1.2 1.2 1.1
Productivity per hour [b]  2.2 2.9 1.8 1.9 1.6
Capital intensity per hour [c]  0.9 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.7
Non-ICT capital intensity per 
hour  0.6  0.9   0.8   0.2   0.4  
ICT capital intensity per hour  0.3    0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 
TFP [d]  1.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 0.9 
 
B - Japan 
 1980-2006 1980-1990  1990-1995  1995-2000 2000-2006
GDP  2.3 3.9 1.5 1.0 1.5
Productivity per employee [a]  1.8 2.7 0.9 1.0 1.6
Productivity per hour [b]  2.4 3.1 2.4 1.7 2.0
Capital intensity per hour [c]  1.4 1.6 1.9 1.5 0.8
Non-ICT capital intensity per 
hour  1.0 0.3 1.5 0.9 0.5 
ICT capital intensity per hour  0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3
TFP [d]  1.0 1.5 0.5 0.2 1.2 
 
C – United-Kingdom 
 1980-2006 1980-1990  1990-1995  1995-2000 2000-2006
GDP  2.5 2.6 1.7 3.2 2.5
Productivity per employee [a]  2.0 1.9 2.5 1.9 1.6
Productivity per hour [b]  2.2 2.0 2.8 2.3 2.0
Capital intensity per hour [c]  1.1 1.0 1.5 1.1 0.9
Non-ICT capital intensity per 
hour  0.6 0.6 1.1 0.4 0.5 
ICT capital intensity per hour  0.5 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.4 
TFP [d]  1.1 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 
 
D – United States 
 1980-2006 1980-1990  1990-1995  1995-2000 2000-2006
GDP  3.1 3.3 2.5 4.1 2.4
Productivity per employee [a]  1.6 1.4 1.2 2.0 1.9
Productivity per hour [b]  1.6 1.4 1.0 2.0 2.2
Capital intensity per hour [c]  0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.0
Non-ICT capital intensity per 
hour  0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.6 
ICT capital intensity per hour  0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 
TFP [d]  0.9 0.8 0.5 1.2 1.2 
[d] = [b]-[c].Source: Authors’ estimation, see Box 1 for data sources and Box 2 for details on TFP 







Graph 1: Labor productivity per hour, as a % of the United States level 
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Source: Authors’ estimation, see Box 1 for data sources and Box 2 for details on TFP calculations. 
 
 
Graph 2: Total factor productivity, as a % of the United States level 
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Graph 3: Average annual hourly labor productivity growth (in %) and contributions in 
France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States - 1890-2006 - In percentage points 
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Graph 4: Average annual hourly labor productivity growth (in %) and contributions in 
France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States - 1890-2006 - In percentage points 
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Appendix Table 1: GDP per hour worked, as a % of the United States level (in ppp 1990$) 
  1870 1913 1950  1973  2003 
Japan  20 21 16  49  64 
United Kingdom  113 84 63  67  79 
Source: From Maddison (2007, Table 6.4, p. 305). Scope: Economy as a whole  
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Structure of employment, as a % of total employment 
 France  Japan  United 
Kingdom 
United States 
1970  2004 1970 2004 1970 2004 1970 2004 
Agriculture and 
mining  14.3 3.7 20.2 5.4 5.2 1.5 5.2 2.8
Manufacturing, 
gas and water  25.8 14.4 26.5 17.7 33.0 12.3 23.2 10.9




hotels  15.5 17.3 20.9 25.5 19.0 23.3 21.6 23.8
Transport and 
storage and 
communication   5.6 6.2 5.6 5.8 6.7 5.9 4.6 4.2
Other services  28.7 52.0 18.8 36.6 28.9 50.2 40.5 52.3
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Base EUKLEMS 
 
 
Appendix Table 3: Breakdown of labor productivity growth in France (% per year) 
  1896-1913 1913-1929 1929-1951 1951-1973 1973-1984
Productivity per employee  











Contributions :   
Capital intensity, per hour [c]  0.6 0.7 0.5 1.4 1.8
Total factor productivity [d]  1.4 1.8 1.2 4.2 2.0




Appendix Table 4: Average annual hourly productivity and total factor productivity growth 
(% per year) 









1870-1913  2.0 1.2 1.9 -0.2 0.3 0.4
1913-1950  1.8 1.7 2.5 0.2 0.8 1.6
1950-1973  7.7 3.1 2.8 5.1 1.5 1.8
1973-2003  2.6 2.2 1.7 0.6 0.9 0.7
Source: Maddison (2007, Table 6.5, p. 306). Scope: Economy as a whole. 
 
 
Appendix Table 5 
Breakdown of United States  hourly productivity growth (% per year) 
 1890-1917 1917-1927 1927-
1948 
1948-1973 1973-1995 1995-2003
Productivity per hour [b]  1.5 3.8 1.8 2.9  1.4 3.0
Contributions :   
Capital intensity, per hour 
[c] 
0.7 1.0 0.1 1.0  1.0  1.6 
Total factor productivity [d] 0.8 2.8 1.7 1.9  0.4 1.4
[b] = [c] + [d]. Source: Ferguson and Wascher (2004, p. 6). Scope: Non-agricultural market sector. 
 
 
Appendix Table 6: Average annual ICT contribution to the growth of GDP or labor 
productivity (% per year) in France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan.  
Results of some international comparisons  








1989-1995 1995-2000 2000-2004 1990-1995 1995-2001 1995-2001 1995-2004 
France  0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5
Japan  0.3 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.6 na na
United 
Kingdom 
0.3 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6  1.0 
United States  0.5 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.8
* Contribution to GDP growth, ** Contribution to the growth of the labor productivity per employee. 





Appendix Table 7: Average annual labor productivity growth and contributions (%per year) in 
the United States 
  Oliner Sichel and Stiroh 
(2007)* 





















Productivity per hour  1.47 2.51 2.86 2.14 2.82 1.49 2.70 2.50
Capital intensity per hour  0.76 1.11 0.85 1.14 1.40 0.85 1.51 1.26
Non-ICT capital intensity 
per hour 
0.30 0.02 0.24  0.70  1.19  0.45  0.49  0.69 
ICT capital intensity per 
hour 
0.46 1.09 0.61  0.43  0.21  0.40  1.01  0.58 
TFP  0.71 1.40 2.01 0.75 1.14 0.39 1.00 0.92
Scope: * Non-farm business sector, ** Private economy 
 
 
Appendix Table 8 
Average annual ICT price growth (% per year) in France, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Japan- 1980-2005 
    1980-2005 1980-1990 1990-1995  1995-2000  2000-2005 
France  -4.0 -1.5 -5.8    -6.7  -4.5 
Japan  -5.7 -3.5 -6.6    -9.5  -5.3 
United Kingdom  -5.2 -3.5 -5.9    -8.2  -4.8 
United States  -4.8   -3.5   -5.4   -7.4   -4.3  




Appendix Graph 1 
 
ICT investment –GDP ratio in France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan 
for 1980-2005 
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Sources: see Box 1. 
Scope: Economy as a whole  
 
 